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1. Introduction 
Electoral systems play a crucial role in shaping incentives within which public policies 
are established. Political economy literature includes a substantial body of work 
devoted to the task of exploring the impact on public expenditure of plurality versus 
proportional electoral rules, and of the size of electoral districts. However, few works 
have been done (Osborne and Slivinsky, 1996; Bordignon et al., 2010; Bracco and 
Brugnoli 2011) on the possibility that elections do not take place in a one-shot game, 
but in a two-stage process. 
We will focus our attention on the Italian case, which is very interesting from the point 
of view of the impact of different electoral systems on fiscal policies, since it includes 
municipalities which adopt the single-ballot system, and others that adopt the double-
ballot system, depending on the size of their respective populations. If a municipality’s 
population is less than 15,000, the mayor is elected by means of a single-ballot system 
and only a single list can support her/him, otherwise the election is conducted 
according to a double-ballot system and multiple lists are admitted to support 
her/him. 
By using a data set on the financial and electoral characteristics of Italian municipalities 
in 2001-20071, we find evidence that, as a result of different electoral rules, per capita 
own revenue and current expenditure (in this case the evidence is weaker) are lower in 
large municipalities than in small ones. However, if the mayor of a large municipality is 
supported by a broad coalition, then the result tends to disappear. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next Section outlines the 
financial and electoral characteristics of Italy’s municipalities. Section 3 reviews the 
relevant literature. In Section 4 we describe the theoretical background. The dataset is 
illustrated in Section 5. In Section 6 we develop the empirical approach to testing the 
                                                          
1
 We did not collect data available from 2008 to 2011, because in this period the local fiscal system has been deeply 
reformed more than one time. In 2008 the property tax (ICI) levied on principal dwellings was replaced by 
intergovernmental grants. In 2012, instead, a substantial part of intergovernmental grants to municipalities was 
replaced by the introduction of a new property tax on principal dwellings (IMU) and a set of local devolved small 
taxes in 2011. There is in Italy some narrative evidence showing that the change in 2008 determined an increase in 
local spending (linked to population, given that the vertical transfer are allocated according to population) and, that 
in 2011-2012 a decrease in the local spending. On the contrary in the years 2001-2007 we do not assist to any 
structural reform of the Italian local fiscal tax system and so the electoral system effect we want to capture is more 
clear-cut identified. 
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impact of electoral systems on fiscal policies. Sections 7 and 8 respectively present the 
results and some robustness checks. The final section concludes. 
 
2. Institutional framework 
The Italian Constitution provides for five layers of government: central government, 
the regions (ordinary statute regions and special statute regions), the provinces, the 
local municipalities (more than 8,000 bodies), and the metropolitan authorities (which 
are yet to be constituted). 
In our data set as regards their share of the overall government budget, municipalities 
account on average for about 8.6% of total public expenditure in Italy during 2001-
2007 (that is the time span we used in the empirical analysis). They are responsible for 
a large array of important public programs in the field of welfare services, territorial 
development, local transport, infant school education, sports and cultural facilities, 
local police services, as well as most infrastructural spending. On the revenue side, as a 
result of a lengthy process of fiscal devolution, municipalities can rely on own-source 
taxes for about 40% (average during 2001-2007) of their total revenue. The main 
municipal taxes are a property tax, a tax on urban waste disposal, a tax on the 
occupation of public space, and a surtax on the personal income tax levied by central 
government. With regard to these taxes, municipalities have some powers to set rates 
and to establish other basic elements of the tax bases. Other revenue derives from 
various charges for public utilities and for services such as refuse collection, or the 
provision of public infrastructures. Transfers from central government account on 
average for about 30% of the municipal budget during 2001-2007. 
As for the municipal-level electoral system, since 1993 Italy has opted for a mayor-
council system: the municipal council members and the mayor are separately elected 
directly by citizens in elections normally held every 5 years. The mechanism of direct 
election implies that the mayor is endowed with strong powers over municipal politics 
(a basic feature of presidential government), even though the council retains the 
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power to dismiss the mayor by means of a vote of no confidence in him/her (a basic 
feature of parliamentary government).2  
There are two different systems for the election of the mayor, and of the municipal 
council, depending on the number of inhabitants in the municipality. The first applies 
to municipalities with up to 15,000 inhabitants (referred to herein as “small” 
municipalities), while the second applies to those with more than 15,000 inhabitants 
(“large” municipalities). The decennial census is the statistics used to distinguish 
between small and large municipalities. According to the 1991 census, in our dataset 
small municipalities (that is, the vast majority of Italian municipalities) count 6,044, 
whereas there are 508 large ones, while in the 2001 census, the small municipalities 
number 6,019, whereas there are 533 large ones. 
In small municipalities, the electoral system is quite simple: each mayoral candidate is 
associated with a list of candidates for member of the city council. Voters are entitled 
to vote for a mayoral candidate and may cast, if they wish, a preference vote for a 
specific candidate for member of the city council. The mayoral candidate who gains 
the largest number of votes is elected mayor.  
A double-ballot majoritarian electoral mechanism is applied in the case of large 
municipalities. Each mayoral candidate is associated with one list, or coalition of lists, 
of candidates for the post of councilor; in the first ballot, voters are entitled to vote for 
a mayoral candidate and, if they wish, for one list associated, or otherwise, with said 
candidate (that is, a split vote is permitted). Each mayoral candidate must officially 
declare his/her affiliation to one or more lists running for election to the council. This 
declaration shall only be deemed valid if it coincides with similar declarations made by 
the candidates featured on the lists in question. In other words, a coalition of parties is 
                                                          
2 
The council performs this task through the discussion and approval of the executive’s courses of action as set out 
in the program that the mayor has to submit to the council together with his/her budget proposals.  If a vote of 
approval is not passed, then two different scenarios may ensue: either the government continues with its action 
without the council exercising its extreme power; or else the council does in fact exercise said power by voting a 
motion of no confidence, which if approved leads to new elections for both the council and the mayor (Scarciglia, 
1993, Fabbrini, 2001). 
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offered to electors. The mayoral candidate who receives the absolute majority of votes 
is elected mayor in the first ballot. 
If the mayoral candidate does not receive the absolute majority of votes in the first 
ballot, then a second ballot is held between the two candidates collecting the largest 
number of votes in the first round.3 During the second ballot, voters are entitled to 
vote for a mayoral candidate, whereas council members are those elected in the first 
round. The candidate who ultimately obtains the absolute majority of votes is elected 
mayor.  
 
3. Related literature 
Political science literature investigated on the difference between single versus 
double-ballot regarding the number of equilibrium candidates in the electoral 
competition both theoretically (Cox, 1997; Mayerson, 1999) and empirically  (Fujiwara 
2011). There is also a narrow stream of literature in political economy,  theoretical 
(Osborne and Slivinsky, 1996) and both theoretical and empirical (Bordignon et al. 
2010) and only empirical  (Bracco and Brugnoli, 2011) looking at the impact of the two 
different electoral systems on public policy decisions. 
The theoretical literature starts from the Duverger's Law (1954) saying that ‘‘simple-
majority single-ballot favors the two party system’’ whereas ‘‘simple majority with a 
second ballot or proportional representation favors multipartyism.” This intuition has 
been formalized in two theoretical papers (Cox, 1997; Mayerson, 1999) as the “M+1 
rule”: if M is the number of seats available, M+1 turns to be the number of candidates 
on whom the voters have an incentive, given the strategic behavior favored by the 
voting mechanism, to concentrate their votes. As a matter of fact, in a single-ballot 
plurality rule election, if a citizen believes that candidates 1 and 2 have the greatest 
chances of winning the election, even if said citizen’s preferred candidate is candidate 
3, he/she strategically chooses to vote for 1 or 2 in order to maximize his/her chances 
of being a pivotal voter. As all voters vote according to a similar logic, candidate 3 is 
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 In the period between the first and second ballots, the lists excluded during the first round can now join those that 
are backing one of the two candidates in the second round, thus creating a sort of band-wagoning effect.  
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deserted by his/her supporters, who all vote for candidates 1 or 2. Similarly, in the first 
round of a double-ballot plurality rule election, given that two seats are at stake in this 
case, three candidates remain in the running for the second round of voting (Cox 1997, 
Martinelli 2002). Note, however, that this holds when there is no risk of the 
unexpected victory of the minority candidate during the first round, that is, when the 
share of electors backing said candidate is very small (Bouton, 2010).  
There are very few empirical works on the single vs double ballot electoral system. 
Fujiwara (2011) uses figures for mayoral elections held in Brazil in 1996-2004, to 
provide evidence that a transition from the single to the double-ballot system leads to 
an increase in the number of votes cast for third-placed candidates, and a reduction 
not only in the gap between the votes cast for the second and third-placed candidates, 
but also in that between the winning candidate and the third-placed candidate. 
Bordignon et al. (2010), build up a theory linking the electoral mechanism with the 
fiscal decisions of the elected governments, and use data on mayoral elections in Italy 
during the period 1985-2007 finding, in line with previous literature, that the double-
ballot leads to a larger number of candidates than the single-ballot. However, in the 
presence of a not very polarized electorate, the double-ballot system reduces the 
influence of extremist groups on political policies, allowing moderate parties to run on 
their own platforms, without being forced to reach a compromise with extremist 
parties; while for any given level of polarization, the single-ballot system favors 
coalitions of moderates and extremists. Consequently, they find, in line with Osborne 
and Slivinsky (1996), that equilibrium policies are more dispersed under plurality than 
under run-off, which elicits more "centrist" policy platforms, limiting the influence of 
extremist voters. Bracco and Brugnoli (2012) in a post-dated work to ours find that in a 
double-ballot system taxes are lower than in a single-ballot, without however 
investigating the impact on this result of the number of lists in the coalition supporting 
the mayor; moreover, interestingly, they also find that run-off municipalities politically 
aligned with the central government receive, ceteris paribus, more transfers than 
those not aligned. 
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4. Theoretical background 
The single and double-ballot regimes, for a given not too strong party polarization, 
imply centrist parties to implement their own policies (Bordignon et al., 2010). The 
reason of this behavior stands on the fact that under the double-ballot what matters is 
not to win the first round, but to pass it and to win the final election. A centrist party 
that manages to pass the first round has a larger probability to win the final election, 
as it can then collect the voters of the excluded extremist party, if it is not extremely 
ideological. It will consequently determine two different fiscal policies, which in the 
single-ballot case comes from an agreement between coalitions’ parties and in the 
double-ballot case express the idea of only one party, which has to take account of  
both moderates and extremists and so the former is more moderate than the latter. 
This result holds for not very high polarization levels in the large municipalities. After 
some polarization level the political outcome of the two regimes are identical 
(coalitions form also in large municipalities) and the two policy outcome become very 
close. We test this result by comparing fiscal output of small municipalities and large 
ones, for a given voter’s polarization. Coherently with the political science literature 
(Powell, 1982; Pennings 1998) we proxy polarization in the double-ballot municipality 
with the number of lists backing the mayor.4 The polarization level and so the incentive 
to build up coalitions is crucial in determining the results of Bordignon et al. (2010). So 
if there is any difference in the outcome policies between the single and double ballot 
in the low polarization case, this is related to the possibility that in the double ballot 
case there is no need of coalition to win the election. In this regards it can be 
particularly useful the argument of  Roubini and Sachs (1989) and Kontopoulos and 
Perotti (1999) who argue that coalition members can possibly have divergent interests 
and so they face a prisoner's dilemma with respect to budget cuts: all the partners 
have an incentive to protect a particular part of the budget (Alesina and Drazen, 1991).  
                                                          
4
 Polarization is very often indirectly estimated through the number of parties in an electoral system (Powell, 1982, 
Pennings, 1998), building on Sartori’s idea that in some systems — most often multiparty systems—centrifugal 
forces produce a fleeing from the center and a pattern of polarized pluralism (Sartori, 1976, pp. 131-145). 
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If we link this result to the strategic features of the electoral system we can reasonably 
expect lower expenditure and taxes5 in the double ballot (with low polarization), than 
in the single ballot. In fact the theory to which we refer (Bordignon et al. 2010) says 
that the single-ballot regime always induces parties to merge in coalitions and the 
double-ballot system induces coalitions only if polarization is very high. 
 
5. Data 
The empirical analysis is based on a data-set for Italy’s municipalities resulting from a 
combination of different archives publicly available from the Italian Ministry of the 
Interior, the Italian Ministry of the Economy and the Italian Statistical Office. This panel 
data set covers all Italian municipalities for the period 2001-2007. It includes a full 
array of information organized into four different sections: 1) fiscal data on spending 
and revenue items; 2) institutional data on the main political and personal features of 
municipal bodies (mayor, municipal executive, municipal council), as recorded at the 
end of each year; 3) electoral data covering the results of elections in which the mayor 
and the council members in office during the period covered by the data-set, were 
elected; 4) municipal demographic and socio-economic data such as population size, 
population age structure, and the average income of inhabitants. 
 
5.1 Dependent variables 
Since we are interested in checking if, and how, the electoral system affects budgetary 
decisions taken at municipal level, as our dependent variables we have adopted 
information on own revenue, subdivided into taxes and charges, and information on 
municipal expenditure. As it regards taxes and charges we used per capita revenue as 
in Besley and Case (1995), or in Esteller-Moré and Sole-Ollé (2001) and not tax rates as 
in Besley and Rosen (1998) or Devereux, Lockwood, Redoano (2007, 2008). The reason 
is threefold. First, a tax financial variable is coherent and comparable with spending. 
Second, it would be very difficult to have homogeneous comparable rates for all kind 
                                                          
5
 During 2001-2007, municipalities in Italy have a strong financial constraint (known as internal stability pact) and so 
total revenue and expenditure must trend in very similar way, other ways municipalities can be very penalized with 
federal transfers in subsequent years. 
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of revenues we consider (tax and charges). Third, revenue gives account for both tax 
rate effort and effort in tax evasion control, which are both complementary important 
components of the municipality's fiscal policy.  
 
5.2 The municipal electoral rule and other political variables 
As said before, the municipal electoral rule prescribes two different electoral systems 
for small and large municipalities. This variation in the electoral mechanism is possibly 
exogenous with respect to policy-makers’ decisional area: we set a dummy (large) 
equal to one when the mayor of a municipality, who held office in a certain year during 
the period 2001-2007, was elected according to the large-municipality rule, or to zero 
when, on the contrary, she/he was elected according to the small-municipality rule. 
The result is that our sample includes both those municipalities where the mayor(s) in 
office in each single year over the period 2001-2007 was (were) elected by means of 
one single electoral system, and those where mayor(s) in office in different years was 
(were) elected under both electoral rules. 
The 15,000-inhabitant threshold for the choice of the electoral system to be applied in 
a given municipality/election year, is not measured with reference to the actual 
resident population in that year, but rather to the "certified" population as recorded 
by the census carried out during the first year of each decade by the Italian Statistical 
Office. This mitigates information about population size being misreported by local 
authorities in order to endogenously select the electoral mechanism to be applied in a 
given election year. Moreover, given these operational arrangements, the electoral 
rule may only lead to a change in the electoral system adopted in a given municipality 
if an increase/decrease in the "certified" population, determining a jump from below 
to above (or vice-versa) the discontinuity threshold of 15,000 inhabitants (which, as 
already mentioned, may occur once a decade), actually applies in the election years 
that fall, as a rule every 5 years, during that decade. The treatment variable of the 
regression discontinuity design is, in fact, from 2003 onwards (the year starting from 
which the 2001 census was used to redefine municipalities’ election rules), a dummy 
equal 1 (from the year when election held) if the population of the 2001 census is 
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greater than 15,000, and before 2003 a dummy equal 1 (until election held, after 2003) 
if the population of the 1991 census is greater than 15,000. 
We measure the political power of the mayor by using the number of votes (voteshare) 
cast in the first ballot. Moreover, a categorical variable (list) accounts for the number 
of lists associated, in the first round, with the mayoral candidate running under the 
double-ballot rule. Since Italian law establishes a limit of no more than two 
consecutive mandates for the office of mayor, a dummy variable (termlim) has been 
created to indicate whether a mayor in office in a given year is in his/her second 
consecutive term of office, and thus ineligible for a further term: the impossibility of 
further re-election may significantly bias the budgetary decisions of a municipality 
(Besley and Case 1995; List and Sturm 2006). 
 
5.3. Socio-economic and demographic controls 
We include a set of time-varying variables that characterize a municipality's economic 
and demographic situation, namely: the population of the municipality (population); 
the average per-capita income proxied by the personal income tax base (income); the 
proportion of citizens aged between 0 and 14 (child); the proportion of aged over 65 
(aged); the proportion of foreign residents (foreign residents) and the population 
density computed as the number of citizens per area (density). Finally, there are 
certain time-constant characteristics of a municipality that are likely to affect fiscal 
policies, such as climate and geography. We take these characteristics into account by 
including a dichotomous variable for each municipality. Changes in the macroeconomic 
situation may also affect fiscal policies of all municipalities in certain specific years. To 
account for this, we include a set of time dummies controlling for common yearly 
shocks. 
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6. Empirical framework 
We first run OLS regressions of our financial variables by using the whole available data 
set6 and evaluate the impact of the large municipality electoral system by examining 
the coefficient of the dummy large and its interaction with the number of lists backing 
the elected mayor. 
The financial variables we are interested in are related with actual population because 
of scale economies for expenditure or agglomeration economies for revenues; indeed, 
actual population is, by year, very correlated with legal population (on average the 
correlation index is 0.9419 and it is statistically significant at 1% all the years), implying 
that the effect of the treatment dummy could be determined solely by the level of 
population which must be controlled for assessing the effect of the electoral system on 
the dependent variable. However, in our case the population mean of small 
municipalities (3,352) is statistically lower with respect to the population mean of large 
municipalities (53,531), therefore, the population variable which can mimic the large 
municipality dummy cannot be controlled for. To bypass this problem we use a 
regression discontinuity design (RDD). Namely, we compare the outcome for 
municipalities “just below” and “just above” the treatment threshold because they will 
likely have similar characteristics on average, except for the treatment. If it is the case 
we expect to find a smooth relationship between the outcome and the forcing variable 
(population) at the cut-off point so that any discontinuity in the outcomes can be 
attributed to the treatment variable.  
There are various ways to perform RDD. The simplest approach is to compare average 
outcomes in a small neighborhood on either side of the treatment threshold (Imbens 
and Lemieux, 2008). Nevertheless, this approach could produce very imprecise 
measures of the treatment effect because the RDD method is subject to a large degree 
of sampling variability and this procedure would require very large sample size 
(Petterson-Lidbom, 2008). Given our small sample size, we follow the polynomial 
                                                          
6
 Over 56,707 (8,101 municipalities for 7 years) potential observations, our dataset includes 44,466 observations. As 
a matter of fact we exclude 9,786 (1,398 municipalities for 7 years) observations referred to municipalities in Special 
Statute Regions and Provinces, 2,455 observations relative to municipalities/years where data are not complete or 
incorrect, or to municipalities put under commissioner. 
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approach (Petterson-Lidbom 2008, 2012), that is to regress our dependent variable on 
a pth-order polynomial of the population, in addition to the binary treatment 
indicator. Therefore, the model we estimate takes the following form: 
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾1𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (1) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is a public policy outcome (e.g., total own revenues per capita, taxes per 
capita, charges per capita and current expenditure per capita) for municipality i at time 
t; 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is a treatment indicator which equals 1 if the municipality is in the large 
electoral regime and 0 otherwise; 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is a variable accounting for the number of lists 
in the Council election supporting the mayor: it equals 1 for the single-ballot 
municipalities and for those double-ballot municipalities where only one single list is 
supporting the mayor, otherwise it equals the number of lists supporting the mayor; 
𝑓(𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡) is the control function
7 where the variable pop has been normalized at 0 
when it equals 15,000 because we control not only for a polynomial functional form of 
the population, but also the same function is interacted with the dummy large8; Xit is 
the vector of control variables discussed in both Section 5.2 and 5.3; 𝜇𝑖 accounts for 
municipality fixed effects; 𝜏𝑡 accounts for year fixed effects. 
 
6.1 The identification strategy  
In Italy there are different policies based on population brackets that might affect the 
identification of the impact of the two electoral rules, which hold for small and large 
municipalities, on fiscal policy decisions. In particular, population size determines 
beyond the electoral rule (single round versus runoff), the salary of the mayor, the 
compensation of the members of the executive committee and of the councilors, the 
size of the council, the size of the executive committee, whether or not a municipality 
can have additional elective bodies in every neighborhood and whether or not a 
                                                          
7
 The control function takes the following form: 
𝑓(𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼1𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡
2 +⋯+ 𝛼𝑛𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡
2 +⋯
+ 𝛽𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡
𝑛  
where n is the chosen polynomial order. 
8
 The normalization ensures that the treatment effect at the cut-off point is the coefficient on the treatment 
variable in a regression model with interaction terms.  
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municipality can host hospital facilities or organize a health-care district (Gagliarducci, 
Nannicini, 2013). In addition, the vertical transfers financing system changes 
proportionally with the population (Law 504/1992). Finally, municipalities below 5,000 
inhabitants are exempted from a set of rules imposed by the national government to 
the municipalities in order to improve fiscal discipline (Internal Stability Pact). The only 
range of the population for which it is possible to test the impact of the single vs 
double-ballot electoral rule on fiscal policy decisions without additional overlapping 
institutional breaks, which would make impossible to separately identify the effect of a 
change in the electoral system, is the population threshold between 10,000 and 20,000 
inhabitants. In fact, if we considered, for instance, the 5,000 to 20,000 population 
threshold, not only the electoral rule would change, but also the wage of the mayor, 
the compensation of the members of the executive committee and of the councilors, 
the size of the council, the size of the executive committee and especially the transfers 
from the central government (Law 504/1992) would change. Also if we considered the 
10,000 to 30,000 population threshold, besides the electoral rule, also the possibility 
to host hospital facilities or organize a health-care district and the transfers (Law 
504/1992) amount received by municipalities would change. 
Hence, we restrict the sample to municipalities between 10,000 and 20,000 
inhabitants9. The restriction on the population range 10,000-20,000, reduces the data 
set to a sample of 3,531 observations. Overall we have information on 546 
municipalities, observed at least two times, since our panel is unbalanced10. On 
average, over 2001-2007, the sample (Table A1 in the Appendix) includes 504 
municipalities whose 378 are small municipalities (2,644 observations) and 127 are 
large municipalities (887 observations). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 Summary and descriptive statistics are shown, respectively, in Table 1 and Table 2. 
10
 275 observations are not included for the same reasons illustrated in note 6. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
total own revenue 3531 513.72 231.29 92.04 1815.87 
taxes 3531 348.66 158.41 44.14 1542.03 
charges 3531 165.06 124.45 5.26 1051.38 
current expenditure 3531 676.68 207.94 138.38 1814.08 
child 3531 0.14 0.02 0.08 0.25 
aged 3531 0.18 0.04 0.06 0.32 
foreign residents 3531 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.21 
density 3531 676.45 831.59 39.19 8033.67 
income 3531 9780.21 3405.60 2221.06 20376.77 
voteshare 3531 51.71 12.06 15.70 100.00 
large 3531 0.25 0.43 0 1 
termlim 3531 0.32 0.47 0 1 
population 3531 -1276.20 2630.07 -4999.00 4991.00 
lists 3531 1.67 1.47 1 7 
Note: The variable population has been normalized at 0 when it equals 15,000 inhabitants 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable 
Small Large 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
total own revenue 2644 510.98 236.17 92.04 1815.87 887 521.89 216.02 101.06 1406.95 
taxes 2644 347.19 164.72 44.14 1542.03 887 353.04 137.88 50.54 894.16 
charges 2644 163.79 125.91 5.26 1051.38 887 168.85 119.98 16.60 862.47 
current expenditure 2644 668.61 208.91 138.38 1814.08 887 700.72 203.24 393.42 1636.78 
child 2644 0.15 0.02 0.08 0.25 887 0.14 0.02 0.08 0.22 
aged 2644 0.18 0.04 0.06 0.32 887 0.19 0.04 0.07 0.30 
foreign residents 2644 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.21 887 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.15 
density 2644 631.57 735.90 39.19 8033.67 887 810.22 1056.33 55.55 8033.67 
income 2644 9688.65 3341.34 2221.06 19229.04 887 10053.14 3578.37 2692.98 20376.77 
voteshare 2644 52.60 11.47 16.01 100.00 887 49.03 13.31 15.70 82.45 
termlim 2644 0.33 0.47 0 1 887 0.30 0.46 0 1 
population 2644 -2461.88 1729.48 -4999.00 4828.00 887 2258.10 1391.57 -1509.00 4991.00 
lists 2644 1.00 0.00 1 1 887 3.67 1.81 1 7 
Note: The variable population has been normalized at 0 when it equals 15,000 inhabitants 
As far as regards the timing and frequency of elections, the dataset allows to include 
for all municipalities at least two legislatures, not implying that physically the two 
elections happen in the period 2001-2007, but at least one should fall in that period. In 
fact, in 2001 we observe municipalities that held elections, respectively, in 1997, 1998, 
1999, 2000 and 2001. If elections run every 5 years, municipalities having elections in 
1997 (and observed from 2001) have again elections in 2002 and 2007. Following this 
rule we observe municipalities having elections in 1998 and 2003, in 1999 and 2004, in 
2000 and 2005, in 2001 and 2006. Table 3 shows that 82.05% of municipalities (448) 
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held 2 elections, while 96 municipalities (17,58%) held 3 elections. Just two 
municipalities held more than three elections11.  
Table 3: Number of elections by municipalities 
Number of elections Obs. % 
2 448 82.05 
3 96 17.58 
4 2 0.37 
Total 546 100 
 
Our empirical strategy relies on the treatment coefficient large which is identified 
through municipalities that switch from being small to large electoral regime in the 
period 2001-2007 (see Table A2 in the Appendix), given that we use a fixed effect 
estimate (1). In our dataset there are 38 municipalities out of 546 that switched in the 
considered period. Table 4 shows that 32 municipalities switched from small to large 
electoral regime and 6 municipalities switched from large to small electoral regimes. In 
particular, most of the municipalities (14) switched in the 2004 election followed by 
others 9 municipalities that switched in 2007 elections.12 
Table 4: Switching municipalities by year 
Electoral regime 
Year from small to large from large to small Total 
2001 0 0 0 
2002 0 0 0 
2003 6 1 7 
2004 12 2 14 
2005 1 1 2 
2006 5 1 6 
2007 8 1 9 
Total 32 6 38 
 
Mean differences in policy outcome variables of the switching-municipalities subset 
between small and large electoral regimes, even not statistically different from zero, 
are negative (Table 5). In particular, average per capita total own revenue of large 
municipalities is 22.66 euro lower than that of small municipalities; the same 
difference for per capita current expenditure is 31.84. 
                                                          
11
 For both cases the major resigned before the term and the elections were held at the same year. Additionally it 
might be the case that among those municipalities which held two or three elections the mayors resigned before 
the term and so municipalities held again elections before the regular time (5 years). However, there are no cases 
where the mayor was brought down through a vote of no-confidence during her legislature. 
12
 There are only one municipality (Brusciano) that actually switches from one regime to the other that is not 
considered in our datastet because it was put under commissioner in the considered period. 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics for small and large electoral regimes relative to switching municipalities 
 
small electoral regime large electoral regime 
Difference in Means 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
total own revenue 543.23 214.32 194.21 990.28 520.57 193.58 188.93 897.54 -22.66 
         
(-0.47) 
taxes 364.40 163.23 83.81 801.99 354.82 145.66 133.58 706.23 -9.58 
         
(-35.49) 
charges 178.83 102.77 31.24 543.55 165.75 88.41 29.12 341.57 -13.08 
         
(-22.00) 
current expenditure 696.49 190.03 399.47 1099.75 664.65 170.14 407.81 1031.93 -31.84 
         
(-41.38) 
 
6.2 The large dummy coefficient  
Notice that 𝛾1 accounts for the impact of the large electoral system on the public 
policy and 𝛾2 let us understand how the last impact varies according to the number of 
lists supporting the elected mayor. As long as 𝛾1 + 𝛾2 ∗ 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is statistically significant, 
we can confirm that being in a large electoral regime with the mayor supported by a 
given number of lists, affects the policy decision of the municipality. If 𝛾2 is opposite in 
sign with respect to 𝛾1 it means that the presence of multiple lists offsets (at least 
partially) the difference between the double-ballot where the mayor is supported only 
by one list and the single-ballot where only a unique list can support the mayor. In our 
sample used in the RDD there are municipalities belonging to the double-ballot regime 
(887 observations) with only 1 list (Table A3 in the Appendix) backing the mayor (164 
observations), with 2 lists (65), 3 lists (192), 4 lists (166), 5 lists (136), 6 lists (108) and 
with 7 or more lists (56). 
 
7. Results 
We first run fixed effects regressions using the whole sample with robust standard 
error, clustering by municipality (Tab. 6). The double-ballot system negatively affects 
total own revenue compared to the single-ballot system (-52.92 and 1% significant), 
but this effect becomes smoother the greater the number of lists supporting the 
successful mayoral candidate. The same result stems from regressions of taxes (-32.58 
and 1% significant), charges (-20.34 and 5% significant) and current expenditures (-
43.33 and 1% significant).  The interaction with list is not significant. 
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Table 6: Impact of the large electoral system on the fiscal policy outcome: fixed effect estimates 
Dependent variable 
total own revenue taxes charges current expenditure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
large -52.92*** -32.58*** -20.34** -43.33*** 
 
(14.32) (11.98) (10.37) (15.68) 
large*list 2.24 1.50 0.74 0.16 
 
(1.62) (1.07) (1.25) (1.63) 
population -2,571.42 -1,680.96** -890.46 -4,134.04** 
 
(1,990.52) (691.49) (1,391.23) (1,905.48) 
termlim -0.28 0.89 -1.17 1.02 
 
(2.33) (1.24) (1.95) (2.30) 
child 421.96 248.65 173.31 148.94 
 
(714.33) (532.56) (217.99) (823.06) 
old -1,153.69 -581.39 -572.29* -1,287.90 
 
(1,117.71) (835.47) (314.68) (1,294.47) 
foreign residents -1,388.83*** -489.44 -899.39*** -1,572.29*** 
 
(503.44) (375.22) (149.93) (583.89) 
dens -0.18** -0.08** -0.10** -0.20** 
 
(0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) 
income -74.56 23.67 -98.24 -80.77 
 
(87.19) (37.98) (90.35) (78.55) 
votshare 158.71 -2.40 161.12 499.21* 
 
(427.37) (331.02) (182.66) (272.54) 
Overall Observations 44,466 44,466 44,466 44,466 
Observations small municipalities 41,023 41,023 41,023 41,023 
Observations large municipalities 3,443 3,443 3,443 3,443 
R-squared 0.57 0.42 0.86 0.46 
Notes: Period 2001-2007. All estimates include municipality and year fixed effects. The variables population, dens and income 
have been rescaled by dividing by 1,000. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipal level, are reported in brackets. 
Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
We then run fixed effect regressions by using a RDD with robust standard error, 
clustering by municipality. Also in this case we run regressions for total own revenue, 
taxes, charges and for current expenditure where we interact the dummy large with 
the categorical variable list. For each regression we choose the polynomial order of the 
control function f(pop), by using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). According to 
the AIC, the best polynomial order for the four dependent variables, above mentioned, 
is the sixth (Tab. 8). 
Panel A of Table 7 shows that the double-ballot electoral system with only one list 
supporting the mayor negatively affects total own revenue compared to the single-
ballot system where only a unique list can support the mayor, but this effect becomes 
smoother the greater the number of lists supporting the successful mayoral candidate 
in a double-ballot: in the 6th degree polynomial specification, the coefficient of large 
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interacted with the variable list is +6.18 and 10% significant. When we compute the 
linear combination of the coefficient (large) not interacted with the same coefficient 
interacted with list, it is always significant until the fifth list and decreases as the 
number of lists increases. 
This result is almost entirely due to the revenue from charges (in the 6th degree 
polynomial specification, the coefficient of large is -36.80 and 10% significant; the run-
off coefficient interacted with lists is 4.91 and 10% significant). The revenue from taxes 
is always lower than in the single-ballot system (in the 6th degree polynomial 
specification, the coefficient of large is -31.87, 10% significant and the interacted 
coefficient 1.26, but not significant). Current expenditure is also lower than in the 
single-ballot system  in fact in the 6th degree polynomial specification, the coefficient 
of large is -44.41, 10% significant and the interacted coefficient is 4.05, but not 
significant, however when we compute the linear combination of the coefficient 
(large) not interacted with the same coefficient interacted with list, it is always 
significant until the third list and decreases as the number of lists increases. 
We can than conclude that, whatever the polarization of the electorate supporting the 
mayor in the large municipality, the double-ballot electoral rule leads to a lower 
current expenditure and total own revenue with respect to the single-ballot. The 
reason is that in single ballot municipalities, common pool problems can emerge in 
forming the unique list supporting the mayor,13 or in double ballot municipalities with 
explicit numerous coalitions (the case when the electorate is highly polarized and so 
the candidate has incentive to merge), the incentive to free-ride is stronger than in 
double ballot municipalities with no coalition (the interaction of the large dummy with 
variable list in both estimates of-capita total revenue and expenditure is in fact 
positive), which is the case when the electorate polarization is low and so there is no 
incentive for the candidates to merge (Bordignon et al. 2010). 
 
 
                                                          
13
Even if there is formally a unique list supporting the mayor, common pool problems show up because different 
parties often ally to form the very frequent single Council list (Lista Civica). 
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Table 7: Impact of the large electoral system on the fiscal policy outcome: RDD estimates with fixed effects 
Polynomial order 
A. Estimations without covariates B. Estimation with covariates 
total own 
revenue 
taxes charges 
current 
expenditure 
total own 
revenue 
taxes charges 
current 
expenditure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1st 
   
  
    large -39.18* -23.83 -15.36 -23.08 -54.32*** -29.58* -24.74 -33.57* 
 
(20.55) (15.54) (15.08) (19.65) (19.96) (15.13) (15.39) (19.68) 
large*list 6.26* 1.38 4.88* 4.04 7.96** 1.64 6.32** 5.85 
 
(3.66) (2.30) (2.88) (3.97) (3.43) (2.18) (2.89) (3.94) 
2nd 
   
  
    large -45.30** -23.26 -22.04 -27.36 -61.55*** -29.01* -32.54** -38.90* 
 
(22.67) (16.85) (14.48) (21.68) (22.27) (16.44) (14.95) (21.60) 
large*list 6.30* 1.38 4.92* 4.11 7.90** 1.63 6.27** 5.82 
 
(3.64) (2.30) (2.85) (3.95) (3.40) (2.17) (2.86) (3.92) 
3rd 
   
  
    large -43.09* -24.47 -18.62 -26.38 -58.73** -30.09* -28.64* -37.08* 
 
(23.08) (16.52) (15.90) (21.79) (22.73) (16.11) (16.21) (21.74) 
large*list 6.43* 1.37 5.06* 4.23 8.03** 1.61 6.43** 5.95 
 
(3.65) (2.31) (2.84) (3.96) (3.41) (2.18) (2.86) (3.93) 
4th 
   
  
    large -61.97** -27.56 -34.41* -38.79 -77.40*** -33.93** -43.47** -48.92* 
 
(25.36) (17.02) (19.80) (25.10) (25.01) (16.65) (19.80) (25.05) 
large*list 6.21* 1.32 4.89* 4.10 7.79** 1.53 6.26** 5.82 
 
(3.54) (2.32) (2.73) (3.88) (3.30) (2.19) (2.74) (3.85) 
5th 
   
  
    large -66.74*** -31.13* -35.62** -43.68* -84.08*** -37.91** -46.17** -55.51** 
 
(24.64) (17.18) (17.85) (24.00) (24.90) (16.82) (18.57) (24.07) 
large*list 6.13* 1.23 4.90* 4.02 7.72** 1.45 6.27** 5.76 
 
(3.56) (2.31) (2.75) (3.91) (3.32) (2.19) (2.76) (3.87) 
6th 
   
  
    large -68.67*** -31.87* -36.80* -44.41* -85.13*** -38.32** -46.81** -55.30** 
 
(25.47) (17.37) (19.13) (24.63) (25.65) (16.98) (19.71) (24.68) 
large*list 6.18* 1.26 4.91* 4.05 7.74** 1.46 6.28** 5.76 
 
(3.56) (2.32) (2.76) (3.93) (3.32) (2.19) (2.77) (3.89) 
Overall Observations 3,531 3,531 3,531 3,531 3,531 3,531 3,531 3,531 
Observations small municipalities 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 
Observations large municipalities 887 887 887 887 887 887 887 887 
R-squared 0.88 0.88 0.76 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.76 0.88 
Notes: Period 2001-2007; municipalities with a resident population of between 10,000 and 20,000 inhabitants. Estimation 
methods: polynomial approximation to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th degrees. All estimates include municipality and year 
fixed effects. The estimations in panel B also includes the following covariates: mayor's lame-duck dummy, percentage of votes 
obtained by the mayor when elected (for the double ballot we consider the votes obtained at the first round), share of population 
aged between 0 and 14, share of population over 65 years, share of foreign residents, population density computed as the ratio 
between population and area, per capita personal income tax base. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipal level, are 
reported in brackets. The R-squared is obtained by taking the average R-squared of each polynomial order across regressions. 
Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
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Table 8: Akaike's Information Criterion on Table 7's Regressions 
Polynomial order Controls total own revenue taxes charges current expenditure 
1 yes 40977.21 38210.16 39067.37 40396.44 
2 yes 40979.50 38210.07 39068.14 40399.40 
3 yes 40975.64 38211.58 39057.27 40393.52 
4 yes 40972.89 38210.17 39047.12 40389.09 
5 yes 40972.74 38208.94 39047.34 40389.21 
6 yes 40972.13 38206.41 39046.51 40388.61 
1 no 41071.40 38235.36 39141.30 40489.62 
2 no 41073.33 38236.58 39141.18 40490.89 
3 no 41068.89 38237.99 39129.95 40484.30 
4 no 41067.34 38236.43 39122.09 40481.73 
5 no 41066.56 38234.81 39122.56 40482.90 
6 no 41065.87 38232.61 39121.20 40481.54 
 
8. Robustness checks  
In order to confirm that our results are robust and the identification strategy holds, we 
need to be sure that the discontinuity we found in the dependent variables is not 
driven by the discontinuity of our exogenous variables.  
First, we replicate all the regressions of the previous Section, by controlling for all 
covariates: all the results obtained in the polynomial specifications still hold (Table 7, 
panel B). 
Second, we check whether there is a discontinuity in the forcing variable by performing 
a McCrary test (McCrary, 2008) which is shown in Fig. 1. The Figure displays no 
evidence of strong discontinuity at the cut-off.  
 
Figure 1: McCrary Test. Weighted kernel estimation of the log density, performed separately on either side of 
the threshold. Optimal bandwith and binsize as in McCrary (2008) 
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Third, we test whether the covariates do not show any discontinuity with respect to 
the population. As reported in Table 9 we do not reject the null hypothesis of zero 
discontinuity in all polynomial order, for dens, votshare and termlim, while for child we 
find a significance only in the fifth polynomial order and for both old and foreign 
residents we do not reject the null hypothesis of zero discontinuity starting from the 
fourth polynomial order. Income is significant for the second, third, fourth and fifth 
polynomial order, however the sign (positive) of the discontinuity goes in the opposite 
direction of the sign (negative) we find for the large dummy.  Notice that in our 
preferred specification, namely the sixth polynomial order degree, we do not reject 
the null hypothesis for any of our covariates. 
Forth, we test whether the treatment dummy is determined by any of the covariates 
and we do that by regressing the treatment dummy against all the covariates and the 
control function. We replicate the regressions by using different control functions from 
the first up to the sixth polynomial order. We test (Table 10) whether the coefficients 
are significantly different from zero and also not jointly significantly different from 
zero. All the coefficients, excluding the control function, are not significant except old 
in the first, second, third and fourth order polynomial control function, foreign 
residents in the regression with a first order polynomial control function and density in 
the sixth order polynomial control function; in all the regressions the covariates are 
never jointly significantly different from zero. 
Fifth, we run a placebo test for the polynomial from the first up to the sixth order. We 
used the sample of municipalities with populations of between 10,000 and 20,000, and 
in the sub-sample of the small municipalities we set (Tab. 11) a threshold 
corresponding to the median population (12,057), and did likewise for the sample of 
large municipalities, which gave a median population of 16,957 (Tab. 12). We ran the 
same regressions that we had run with the 15,000 threshold, but the coefficient that 
accounts for the threshold effect was never significant a part that of charges (10% 
significant) in the regression with the “fake” threshold of 16,957 inhabitants for the 
first order polynomial control function and covariates (Tab. 12, Panel B). 
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Finally, we do a graphical analysis (Figure 2) for all the dependent variables used in the 
regression. The population is normalized at 15,000. The graphs report the fitted values 
from a regression model estimated separately on each side of the threshold, using the 
polynomial of the population that best fits the data. We choose to divide both sides of 
the cut-off in 50 bins,14 taking for each bin the average of the reported dependent 
variable15. The graphs related to total own revenue (Panel A), taxes (Panel B) and 
charges (Panel C) show a clear evidence of discontinuity around the cut-off; while for 
the current expenditure the discontinuity seems less clear-cut (Panel D). 
Figure 2: The impact of double-ballot elections on fiscal policies 
 
Notes: Period 2001-2007; municipalities with population between 10,000 and 20,000 inhabitants. The solid line is the 
fitted value from a regression model estimated separately on each side of the cut-off point  using the polynomial that 
best fits the data according to AIC criterion. Scatter points are averaged over a bandwidth of 50 bins at either side of the 
normalized population size (i.e, population minus 15,000). Each bins on the left of the cut-off contains, on average, 48 
observations, while each bins on the right of the cut-off includes, on average, 22 observations. 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 The graphical analyses with 25, 100, 200 bins are available upon request. 
15
 Each bins on the left of the cut-off contains on average 48 observations, while each bins on the right of the cut-off 
includes, on average, 22 observations. 
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Table 9: Specification test of whether covariates have an effect at the discontinuity cut-off point 
Polynomial order 
Estimations without covariates 
child old dens income votshare termlim foreign residents 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1st 
       large -0.18 -0.27** -7.10 167.41 -0.83 -0.18 -0.55* 
 
(0.17) (0.13) (8.46) (118.64) (2.99) (0.18) (0.31) 
large*list 0.01 0.01 0.88 6.73 -0.94* 0.05* 0.11** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (1.08) (19.65) (0.50) (0.03) (0.05) 
2nd 
       large -0.27 -0.22* -3.28 189.30** -1.43 -0.22 -0.57* 
 
(0.17) (0.13) (5.57) (93.97) (2.97) (0.18) (0.29) 
large*list 0.01 0.02 0.93 7.26 -0.95* 0.05* 0.10** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (1.09) (19.83) (0.50) (0.03) (0.05) 
3rd 
       large -0.25 -0.23* -1.56 194.80** -1.83 -0.22 -0.56* 
 
(0.18) (0.13) (5.46) (96.80) (3.03) (0.19) (0.31) 
large*list 0.01 0.02 0.99 7.05 -0.96* 0.05* 0.10** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (1.09) (19.90) (0.50) (0.03) (0.05) 
4th 
       large -0.34 -0.23 0.64 202.10* -3.88 -0.13 -0.44 
 
(0.22) (0.15) (7.52) (114.90) (3.47) (0.20) (0.34) 
large*list 0.01 0.02 1.00 7.23 -0.99** 0.05* 0.10** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (1.11) (20.06) (0.50) (0.03) (0.05) 
5th 
       large -0.38* -0.23 -6.41 201.23* -3.37 -0.18 -0.51 
 
(0.22) (0.14) (6.44) (119.09) (3.37) (0.20) (0.32) 
large*list 0.01 0.02 0.84 6.89 -0.97** 0.05* 0.10** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (1.09) (19.76) (0.49) (0.03) (0.05) 
6th 
       large -0.38 -0.21 -8.42 177.27 -3.89 -0.20 -0.47 
 
(0.23) (0.15) (6.84) (137.59) (3.42) (0.21) (0.33) 
large*list 0.01 0.02 0.87 7.49 -0.96* 0.05* 0.10** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (1.09) (19.86) (0.49) (0.03) (0.05) 
Overall Observations 3,531 3,531 3,531 3,531 3,531 3,531 3,531 
Observations small municipalities 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 
Observations large municipalities 887 887 887 887 887 887 887 
R-squared 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.70 0.42 0.94 
Notes: Period 2001-2007; municipalities with a resident population of between 10,000 and 20,000 inhabitants. Estimation 
methods: polynomial approximation to the 1st,2nd,3rd,4th,5th and 6th degrees. All estimates include municipality and year fixed 
effects. The variables child, old and foreign residents have been rescaled by multiplying by 100. Robust standard errors, clustered 
at municipal level, are reported in brackets. The R-squared is obtained by taking the average R-squared of each polynomial order 
across regressions. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
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Table 10: Specification test of whether large is as good as randomly assigned 
Dependent variable: large   
polynomial order 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
termlim -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
child -0.09 -0.55 -0.43 -0.83 -0.81 -0.82 
 
(0.92) (0.84) (0.82) (0.83) (0.79) (0.80) 
old -1.98** -1.47* -1.48* -1.12* -0.97 -0.87 
 
(0.83) (0.80) (0.79) (0.67) (0.61) (0.60) 
dens -0.87 -0.48 -0.30 -0.06 -0.52 -0.63* 
 
(0.74) (0.47) (0.42) (0.51) (0.35) (0.37) 
income 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 
 
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
votshare -3.08 -3.86 -4.50 -5.47 -4.54 -5.12 
 
(5.53) (4.78) (4.93) (4.47) (3.84) (3.91) 
foreign resident -0.80* -0.56 -0.57 -0.20 -0.23 -0.19 
 (0.48) 
(0.43) (0.43) (0.39) (0.37) (0.37) 
       F-test 1.64 1.17 1.27 1.1 1.56 1.41 
p-value 0.1227 0.3193 0.2652 0.3647  0.1462 0.1979 
Overall Observations 3,531 3,531 3,531 3,531 3,531 3,531 
Observations small municipalities 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,644 
Observations large municipalities 887 887 887 887 887 887 
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 
Notes: Period 2001-2007; municipalities with a resident population of between 10,000 and 20,000 inhabitants. Estimation methods: 
polynomial approximation to the 1st,2nd,3rd,4th,5th and 6th degrees. The variables votshare, dens and income have been rescaled 
by dividing by 10,000. All estimates include municipality, year fixed effects and the interaction term (large*list). Robust standard 
errors, clustered at municipal level, are reported in brackets. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, 
and at the 1% level by ***. 
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Table 11: Placebo tests on fiscal policy outcomes. RDD estimates with fixed effects 
Polynomial order 
Median below (12,057) 
A. Estimations without covariates B. Estimation with covariates 
total own 
revenue 
taxes charges 
current 
expenditure 
total own 
revenue 
taxes charges 
current 
expenditure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1st 
   
  
    large -0.97 13.23 -14.21 -17.15 -0.34 14.44 -14.77 -18.35 
 
(24.13) (11.99) (20.99) (21.43) (23.20) (11.91) (20.50) (20.82) 
large*list -8.59 -9.34* 0.75 1.84 -8.63 -9.51* 0.88 3.30 
 
(6.56) (4.87) (5.02) (6.55) (6.51) (4.91) (4.95) (6.28) 
2nd 
   
  
    large -0.28 11.20 -11.48 -11.32 -1.69 11.78 -13.47 -12.53 
 
(26.62) (14.14) (22.05) (22.55) (25.77) (14.04) (21.73) (21.95) 
large*list -8.04 -8.87* 0.83 2.02 -8.14 -9.07* 0.94 3.38 
 
(6.58) (4.88) (5.04) (6.53) (6.57) (4.93) (4.99) (6.28) 
3rd 
   
  
    large -0.27 15.61 -15.88 -21.29 -0.65 16.25 -16.89 -23.94 
 
(28.04) (16.99) (21.89) (23.12) (27.31) (16.91) (21.68) (22.55) 
large*list -7.99 -8.82* 0.83 1.96 -8.14 -9.05* 0.91 3.26 
 
(6.57) (4.86) (5.06) (6.55) (6.57) (4.91) (5.01) (6.31) 
4th 
   
  
    large 16.00 32.68 -16.69 -14.29 11.91 32.04 -20.13 -19.71 
 
(30.44) (20.31) (22.03) (24.00) (29.69) (20.30) (21.71) (23.25) 
large*list -8.02 -8.83* 0.81 1.94 -8.17 -9.08* 0.91 3.25 
 
(6.56) (4.87) (5.04) (6.62) (6.57) (4.93) (4.98) (6.37) 
5th 
   
  
    large 10.20 22.11 -11.92 -5.97 4.80 21.09 -16.29 -12.90 
 
(32.62) (23.13) (22.28) (24.65) (31.68) (23.20) (21.77) (23.63) 
large*list -8.97 -9.09* 0.12 1.22 -8.99 -9.30* 0.30 2.64 
 
(6.45) (4.85) (5.01) (6.61) (6.49) (4.91) (5.00) (6.40) 
6th 
   
  
    large 4.57 25.02 -20.45 0.17 -0.83 25.04 -25.88 -8.36 
 
(36.02) (26.77) (22.95) (25.86) (34.89) (26.99) (22.27) (25.01) 
large*list -9.25 -9.05* -0.19 1.16 -9.28 -9.26* -0.02 2.57 
 
(6.54) (4.84) (4.96) (6.61) (6.60) (4.89) (4.96) (6.40) 
Overall Observations 2,423 2,423 2,423 2,423 2,423 2,423 2,423 2,423 
R-squared 0.88 0.89 0.76 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.76 0.88 
Notes: Period 2001-2007; municipalities with a resident population of between 10,000 and 15,000 inhabitants. Estimated 
discontinuities in fiscal policy outcome at fake threshold (median below the true 15,000 threshold).  Estimation methods: 
polynomial approximation to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th degrees. All estimates include municipality and year fixed effects. 
The estimations in panel B also includes the following covariates: mayor's lame-duck dummy, percentage of votes obtained by the 
mayor when elected (for the double ballot we consider the votes obtained at the first round), share of population aged between 0 
and 14, share of population over 65 years, share of foreign residents, population density computed as the ratio between population 
and area, per capita personal income tax base. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipal level, are reported in brackets. The R-
squared is obtained by taking the average R-squared of each polynomial order across regressions. Significance at the 10% level is 
represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
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Table 12: Placebo tests on fiscal policy outcomes. RDD estimates with fixed effects 
Polynomial order 
Median above (16,957) 
A. Estimations without covariates B. Estimation with covariates 
total own 
revenue 
taxes charges 
current 
expenditure 
total own 
revenue 
taxes charges 
current 
expenditure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1st 
   
  
    large -8.09 17.33 -25.42 -0.48 -18.02 13.66 -31.68* -8.64 
 
(20.05) (14.98) (15.55) (22.59) (19.39) (13.88) (17.20) (25.40) 
large*list 6.92 -0.87 7.79* 5.27 8.70* -0.20 8.90** 6.13 
 
(5.00) (2.46) (3.99) (5.34) (4.75) (2.12) (4.17) (5.66) 
2nd 
   
  
    large 2.55 21.11 -18.56 3.44 -7.81 16.91 -24.72 -2.10 
 
(22.86) (16.81) (18.55) (26.40) (21.51) (14.83) (19.27) (28.83) 
large*list 6.91 -0.91 7.81** 5.30 8.66* -0.22 8.88** 6.11 
 
(4.93) (2.47) (3.92) (5.31) (4.66) (2.13) (4.09) (5.61) 
3rd 
   
  
    large 2.21 23.79 -21.58 13.47 -2.15 22.74 -24.89 12.52 
 
(29.49) (18.39) (25.38) (33.34) (28.19) (17.42) (25.93) (35.69) 
large*list 6.95 -0.92 7.87** 5.22 8.69* -0.23 8.92** 6.07 
 
(4.97) (2.47) (3.95) (5.37) (4.67) (2.13) (4.09) (5.65) 
4th 
   
  
    large -21.37 6.93 -28.29 29.85 -20.46 8.70 -29.16 32.57 
 
(34.50) (21.17) (29.18) (39.98) (32.68) (20.02) (29.44) (41.30) 
large*list 6.96 -0.90 7.86* 5.06 8.71* -0.21 8.92** 5.87 
 
(5.01) (2.46) (3.99) (5.51) (4.72) (2.13) (4.12) (5.77) 
5th 
   
  
    large -38.47 9.03 -47.50 23.03 -41.16 6.50 -47.66 22.01 
 
(39.36) (24.93) (32.25) (44.54) (37.30) (23.86) (31.50) (46.63) 
large*list 7.06 -0.91 7.97** 5.08 8.85* -0.19 9.04** 5.90 
 
(4.99) (2.47) (3.98) (5.51) (4.69) (2.13) (4.10) (5.78) 
6th 
   
  
    large -27.84 16.80 -44.63 41.93 -30.46 16.59 -47.05 41.08 
 
(47.75) (28.72) (41.83) (53.88) (45.60) (27.44) (40.73) (55.75) 
large*list 6.90 -0.85 7.75* 4.62 8.69* -0.22 8.91** 5.50 
 
(5.02) (2.47) (4.04) (5.53) (4.74) (2.12) (4.17) (5.83) 
Overall Observations 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 
R-squared 0.89 0.86 0.81 0.88 0.90 0.87 0.81 0.89 
Notes: Period 2001-2007; municipalities with a resident population of between 15,000 and 20,000 inhabitants. Estimated 
discontinuities in fiscal policy outcome at fake threshold (median above the true 15,000 threshold). Estimation methods: 
polynomial approximation to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th degrees. All estimates include municipality and year fixed effects. 
The estimations in panel B also includes the following covariates: mayor's lame-duck dummy, percentage of votes obtained by the 
mayor when elected (for the double ballot we consider the votes obtained at the first round), share of population aged between 0 
and 14, share of population over 65 years, share of foreign residents, population density computed as the ratio between population 
and area, per capita personal income tax base. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipal level, are reported in brackets. The R-
squared is obtained by taking the average R-squared of each polynomial order across regressions. Significance at the 10% level is 
represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
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9. Conclusions 
We studied the impact of two different electoral systems on fiscal policies, based on 
the case of Italy’s municipal elections. In Italy, municipalities with less than 15,000 
inhabitants elect their mayor according to a plurality single-ballot system whereby only 
one list can support the candidate who is eventually elected mayor, and very often this 
list represents a coalition of parties converging in a single list. In municipalities with 
more than 15,000 inhabitants, the mayor is elected according to a plurality double-
ballot system, whereby an officially-declared coalition of lists may support her/him.  
We use a 2001-2007 panel dataset of all Italian municipalities with financial, socio-
economic and political data. We test through a RDD at the 15,000 population cut-off 
the impact of the run-off electoral system on current expenditure and evaluate it for a 
given polarization of the electorate supporting the mayor (proxied by the number of 
lists supporting the mayor). 
We find that municipalities under the double-ballot system have lower per capita total 
revenue and current expenditure than those municipalities where a single-ballot 
system holds. These differences become increasingly less robust, the greater the 
number of lists supporting the successful mayoral candidate in the first round of voting 
in double-ballot municipalities. The result confirms previous findings (Roubini and 
Sachs, 1989; Kontopoulos and Perotti, 1999) where the free-riding problem  generate a 
higher level of expenditure followed in the Italian case, given the tight financial 
constraints imposed to municipalities, also by a higher level of taxes. The novelty of 
our result is that it is associated to the used electoral system (single ballot or double 
ballot) for given polarization. In fact it is reasonable to think that in single ballot 
municipalities, for the ex-ante strong incentive of candidates to merge in coalitions 
(Bordignon et al. 2010), or in double ballot municipalities with explicit numerous 
coalitions (the case when the electorate is highly polarized and so the candidates have 
incentive to merge), the incentive to free-ride is stronger than in double ballot 
municipalities with no coalition, which is the  case when the electorate polarization is 
low and there is no incentive for the candidates to merge. 
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Appendix 
 
Data 
Financial variables: from the Italian Ministry of the Interior 
http://finanzalocale.interno.it/sitophp/home_finloc.php?Titolo=Certificati+Consuntivi 
 tax: total real direct taxes by municipality (year 2006 constant euros per capita). 
 charges: total real charges and profits (year 2006 constant euros per capita). 
 taxtot: total real revenue net of borrowing (year 2006 constant euros per capita). 
 exp: total real public current expenditure (year 2006 constant euros per capita). 
 
Political variables: the authors' processing of data from the Italian Ministry of the 
Interior 
http://amministratori.interno.it/AmmIndex5.htm 
http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php?tp=G 
 large: dummy variable equal to one when the municipality has certified population 
of more than 15,000, and zero otherwise. 
 termlim: dummy variable equal to one when the mayor of the municipality cannot 
run for the next election because he/she is already in his/her second term of office, 
and zero otherwise. 
 voteshare: percentage of votes obtained by the mayor when elected (the variable 
refers to the first round of voting for double-ballot municipalities) 
 list: number of lists supporting (at first ballot) the successful mayoral candidate in a 
large municipality (with a certified population of more than 15,000). 
 
Demographic and socio-economic variables: from the Italian Ministry of the Interior 
http://finanzalocale.interno.it/ser/ispett.html 
Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) 
www.istat.it/dati/catalogo/20061102_00/ 
 income: real personal income tax base (year 2006 constant euros per capita). 
 pop: state population. 
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 aged: share of the population over the age of 65. 
 child: share of the population aged between 0 and 14. 
 foreign residents: share of the foreign residents population 
 density: the number of citizens per area. 
 
Table A1: Small and large municipalities by year. Sample size 
10,000 - 20,000 inhabitants 
Year Small Large Total 
2001 375 117 492 
2002 382 120 502 
2003 385 124 509 
2004 384 131 515 
2005 375 129 504 
2006 372 123 495 
2007 371 143 514 
Total Observations 2,644 887 3,531 
Mean  378 127 504 
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Table A2: Small and large electoral regimes and years of elections for switching municipalities 
Municipality 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Years of election 
Adelfia small small small small small large large 2001 and 2006 
Arona large large large large small small small 1998,2002 and 2005 
Bareggio small small large large large large large 1998 and 2003 
Baronissi small small large large large large large 1998 and 2003 
Bellaria-Igea Marina small small small large large large large 1999 and 2004 
Budrio small small small small small small large 1997,2002 and 2007 
Bussolengo small small large large large large large 1998 and 2003 
Calenzano small small small large large large large 1999 and 2004 
Campagna small small large large large large large 1998 and 2003 
Casagiove large large large large large small small 2001 and 2006 
Casamassima small small large large large large large 2001 and 2003 
Caselle Torinese small small small small small small large 1998, 2002 and 2007 
Castel Maggiore small small small large large large large 1999 and 2004 
Castellanza large large large small small small small 1999, 2004 and 2006 
Cerea small small small small small small large 1998, 2002 and 2007 
Corciano small small small large large large large 1999 and 2004 
Fiesole large large large small small small small 1999 and 2004 
Frattaminore small small small small large large large 1998,2002,2005 and 2007 
Ghedi small small small large large large large 1999 and 2004 
Gualdo Tadino small small small large large large large 2000 and 2004 
Impruneta large large small small small small small 1998 and 2003 
Malnate small small small small small small large 1997,2002 and 2007 
Maranello small small small large large large large 1999 and 2004 
Mentana . small small small small large large 2002 and 2006 
Monte Sant'Angelo . large large large large large small 2002 and 2007 
Negrar small small small large large large large 1999 and 2004 
Palagiano . small small small small small large 2002 and 2007 
Pavullo nel Frignano small small small small small large large 2001 and 2006 
Pianoro small small small large large large large 1999 and 2004 
Policoro small small small small small large . 2001 and 2006 
Rosarno small small large large large large large 1998,2003 and 2006 
Sabaudia small small small small small small large 1998,2002 and 2007 
Signa small small small large large large large 1999 and 2004 
Spoltore . small small small small small large 2002 and 2007 
Tarquinia small small small small small small large 1998,2002 and 2007 
Terzigno small small small large large large large 1999,2004 and 2007 
Trecate small small small small small large large 2001 and 2006 
Umbertide small small small large large large large 1999 and 2004 
Notes: missing value are represented by dots. 
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Table A3: Number of lists by small and large municipalities. Municipalities between 10,000-20,000 inhabitants 
Small Large 
N°lists     Obs 
N° of municipalities 
(average across 2001-2007) % N°lists     Obs 
N° of municipalities 
(average across 2001-2007) % 
1 2,644 378 100 1 164 23 18 
   
  2 65 9 7 
   
  3 192 27 22 
   
  4 166 24 19 
   
  5 136 19 15 
   
  6 108 15 12 
   
  >7 56 8 6 
Total 2,644 378 100   887 127 100 
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